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Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.:
Reasoned or Result-Oriented

Jurisprudence?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The State, in criminal prosecutions, cannot use peremptory
challenges' to exclude prospective jurors solely on account of race, so
held the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky;2 such an act violates
the 14th Amendment Equal Protection3 rights of the excluded individual. 4 While peremptory challenges are valuable in the selection of an
impartial jury, Batson held this must bow to the more important goal
of ridding racism from the courtroom.5 Unanswered by Batson,
however, was whether its rule applied to civil trials; for since the state
is not a party in civil suits, there would appear to be no basis for
applying the Equal Protection Clause, or indeed any constitutional
amendment, against private civil litigants.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 6 answered this question
affirmatively. The Court in Edmonson held that there was sufficient
governmental involvement in the exercise of peremptory challenges to
warrant treating private parties as state actors, and thereby subject
1. A peremptory challenge is "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-

ARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text for a discussion

of peremptory challenges.
2. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1 ("[njor [shall any State] deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
4. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
5. Id. at 98-99. The Court stated:
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an

important position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our decision
today will undermine the contribution the challenge generally makes to the
In view of the heterogeneous population of
administration of justice ....
our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of
law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from

Id.

jury service because of his race.
6. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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them to the Constitution's strictures. 7 As in Batson, the Court found
that the use of the peremptory challenge mechanism in a racially
biased manner was unacceptable.' Again, the utility of the peremptory
challenge mechanism was subjugated to the greater goal of eliminating

racism from courts.
While this is indeed a laudable goal, the Court's conclusion that
a private civil litigant was the functional equivalent of the State, when

exercising a peremptory challenge, is far from self-evident. This Note
analyzes Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. and explains how the
Court reached its conclusion. Part II traces the historical development
of the peremptory challenge prior to Edmonson. Part III presents the
Edmonson case, analyzes it fully, and explains Edmonson's implications for the future. Part IV concludes that the Court used resultoriented jurisprudence and improperly decided the case.

II.
A.

THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

HISTORY

The use of peremptory challenges is simply one facet in the jury

selection process. Selection of a jury begins with the compiling of the
venire.9 Generally, the venire is selected from voter registration lists,
and both federal' and state" statutes for compilation of the venire
mandate a random selection process from a fair cross-section of the
community. 12

7. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083-87 (1991).
8. Id. at 2082 ("Indeed, discrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury
in a civil proceeding harms the excluded juror no less than discrimination in a criminal
trial.").
9. A venire is "[tihe group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a given
case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990).
10. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1861 (1988).
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes. It is further the policy of the United
States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service
on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States, and
shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.
Id.
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, para. 8 (1991) (process for drawing jurors).
12. The Supreme Court has consistently found the fair cross section requirement
as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to jury trial incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause and made applicable to the states); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
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The fair cross-section requirement ensures a broader diversity of
knowledge and experience among the jurors. 3 Diversity provides for
jurors who have individual perspectives and different methods for
understanding and analyzing the factual information, and this helps
in reaching a more reasoned and considered verdict. 4 Cross-section
representation also advances the policy goals of full public participation in the legal process and acceptance of legal verdicts. 5
Once the venire is assembled, voir dire occurs. Voir dire is the
examination of prospective jurors by the court and attorneys to
determine the jurors' qualifications and suitability to serve;' 6 that is,
their ability to provide the parties with a fair and impartial trial. As
the venire is the pool from which the jury is chosen, it follows that
not all members of the venire will become members of the jury.
Veniremen are excused, and therefore do not become jurors, through
either challenges for cause or peremptory challenges.
A challenge for cause is based on a specified cause or reason
prescribed by rule or statute 7 such as bias, lack of legal qualifications,
or relationship to a party.' 8 Challenges for cause are unlimited to
ensure a party is not deprived of her constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury.' 9
Peremptory challenges have not historically required a stated
cause or reason. 20 The primary purpose for allowing challenges without a showing of cause has been to promote the appearance of
justice. 2' This concept was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in
Swain v. Alabama:22 "[T]o perform its high function in the best way,
justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Allowing parties to
excuse jurors, even for sudden impressions, unaccountable prejudices
13. See generally JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY
THE LAW, ART, & SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY sec. 6.13 (2d ed. 1990).

REv.

SELECTION:

14. See id.
15. See id.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
17. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1870 (1988). Illinois' requirements may be found at ILL.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4(d) (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, para. 14 (1991).
18. See generally LILLIAN B. HARDWICK & B. LEE WARE, JUROR MISCONDUCT:

LAW & LITIGATION sec.

3.03 (1990).

19. See generally GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 13, sec. 7.01
(2d ed. 1990); infra note 47 (Sixth Amendment).
20. See generally GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 19, sec. 8.01.
21. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1894); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
22. 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)). See infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussion of Swain).
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or for arbitrary and capricious reasons, helps courts to attain that
goal. 23 Peremptory challenges provide a method of removing potentially biased jurors who could not be removed for cause, because
either the judge refused to grant the challenge or no overt apparent

cause existed. The parties have a greater voice in the selection of their
own jury, which enhances the acceptability of the verdict and of the
judicial system as a whole. The critical policy goal of "appearance of

justice" is accomplished. Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory
challenges are limited in number. Unlimited peremptory challenges
would allow an attorney to frustrate the jury seating process by simply
making continuous challenges.
While peremptory challenges originated in this country through
the common law, they are now governed by statute. 24 The present

federal system allows from three to twenty peremptory challenges per
side. 25 All the states have followed similar paths and allow peremptory
challenges in both criminal and civil trials. 26 Generally, the number
of permitted challenges depends upon whether the proceeding is civil
or criminal. 27 A greater number of challenges are usually permitted in
criminal cases although the number may vary depending upon whether
the crime is a misdemeanor or a felony. 28 Felonies entail very serious
punishments, and therefore it becomes increasingly critical to ensure
23. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
24. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214 (1965) (giving a detailed discussion
of the development of the peremptory challenge in America).
25. Each party is allowed three peremptory challenges in civil cases. 28 U.S.C.
sec. 1870 (1988). The number of peremptory challenges allowed in criminal cases
varies:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges
and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the
offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year
or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there
is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional
FED.

peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.

R. Cpn.

P. 24(b).

26. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 217 (listing various state statutes providing
examples of state variations). "In every State, except where peremptory strikes are a
substitute, peremptory challenges are given by statute to both sides in both criminal
and civil cases . . . ." Id. at 217. Illinois' rules for peremptory challenges may be
found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4(e) (1991); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para.
2-1106 (1991).
27. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 13, sec. 8.02 (2d ed. 1990).
28. Id. at 273-74.
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the seating of a fair and impartial jury. Because peremptory challenges
are statutory in nature and not constitutionally required, each state
may determine the number of challenges available in any particular
29
proceeding.
B.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS ON THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The issues raised by racial prejudice within the jury selection
process were first confronted in Strauder v. West Virginia.30 West
Virginia had a statute granting only white persons the right to serve
on juries.3 The Supreme Court struck down the law as being facially
discriminatory and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 2 Even though Strauder did not specifically
address the issue of peremptory challenges, the case is of major
importance because it established the constitutional principle that a
State may not exclude persons from jury service on-account of their

race.
Racial bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges was first
addressed in Swain v. Alabama.33 Swain, a black man, was convicted
of rape and sentenced to death.34 Swain alleged racial discrimination
in the total exclusion of blacks from his jury.35 Asserting Alabama
had exercised its peremptory challenges with racially discriminatory
served on a jury in a
motives, Swain relied on the fact that no black
36
criminal case in that county for fifteen years.
Beginning its analysis, the Court restated the principle that "a
State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race
of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the
Equal Protection Clause." '3 7 The Court also noted the challenge was
not designed to be a tool for effectuating racism.3" However, the
29. Id. at 274.
30. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
31. Strauder v. West Virginia., 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879). The statute read:
"All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of
this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided." Id.
32. Id. at 309-10.
33. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
34. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965).
35. Id. at 203.
36. Id. at 205.
37. Id. at 203-04.
38. Id. at 224. The Court stated:
Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the
outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is
being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate
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Swain Court did not find a racially improper motivation in Alabama's
exercise of its peremptory challenges.3 9 In order to make a prima facie
case, a criminal defendant had to "show the prosecutor's systematic
use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time."40
Additionally, the Court created a presumption that State prosecutors
use their peremptory challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury. 4 I
The fact Alabama used its peremptory challenges to ensure no blacks

were on Swain's jury was insufficient to overcome this presumption. 42
In actuality, the requirement of systematic exclusion over time, coupled with the presumption that prosecutors acted with non-discrimi-

natory intent, made proof of racial bias practically impossible. As a
consequence, Swain was a remedy in name only and was criticized
accordingly.

43

Batson v. Kentucky, 44 another case alleging racial discrimination
in a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, worked a modification
of Swain's prima facie showing. Batson, a black man, was convicted

of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.4 5 During voir dire, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four blacks on
the venire, so that the case was heard by an all white-jury." Batson

moved to discharge the jury on the grounds his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community 47 and

Id.

in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population. These ends
the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or justify.
39. Id.

40. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965).
41. Id. at 222.
42. Id. ("The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore
subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were
removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.").
43. See generally Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence & the White Jury, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase,

41 S.CAL. L. REV. 235, 283-303 (1968); Lisa van Amburg, Comment, A Case Study

of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection & Due Process,
18 ST. Louis U. L.J. 662 (1974); Note, FairJury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J.
322 (1965); Gary L. Geeslin, Note, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion
of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967); Chong Mi Lah,
Note, Peremptory Challenges & the Systematic Exclusion of Minorities: State Courts
Lead the Way, 6 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 43 (1986); Comment, Swain v. Alabama:
A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All- White Jury, 52 VA. L.
REv. 1157 (1966).
44. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
45. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
46. Id. at 83.

47. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
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4 8
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection were violated.
The Court reiterated the view that "[plurposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal
protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure." 49 Although the Supreme Court expressed no view
50
on the merits of the Sixth Amendment argument, the Court found
the burden of proof Swain imposed on criminal defendants no longer
consistent with what the equal protection clause required of the jury
selection process." As a result, Swain's systematic-exclusion-over-time
element was replaced by a recognition that a prosecutor's exercise of
52
a single peremptory challenge could in itself be racially-motivated.
Further, the presumption a prosecutor used peremptory challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury was abandoned in favor of a presumption that the challenge permits "those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate." 5 3 In other words, under Batson, the
prosecutor is presumed to have had discriminatory intent, and this
presumption makes a finding of purposeful discrimination easier.
The Batson Court held there were three elements to a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination. They are: (1) the defendant must
show he was a member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor
group;5 4
exercised peremptory challenges to exclude members of that
(2) the defendant is entitled to rely on the presumption a prosecutor
who could discriminate in fact would discriminate;" (3) the defendant
must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise
challenges to exclude
an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
56
race.
their
of
the veniremen on account

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "); supra note 12.
48. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83 (1986).
49. Id. at 86.
50. Id. at 85 n.4.
51. Id. at 93 ("[W]e reject this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with
standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case
under the Equal Protection Clause.").
52. Id. at 95 ("Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recognized
a
that defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination

in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his
case.") (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).

54. Id.
55. Id. ("The defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can
be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that
permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.").
56. Id.
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If successful in this prima facie showing, the burden shifted to
the State to provide race-neutral explanations for its challenges.' 7 If
the prosecutor failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, then a new
jury would be impanelled and a new trial held. Furthermore, the
prosecutor could neither rebut the prima facie case by claiming the
excluded jurors would be partial to the defendant because of shared
race" nor by merely denying a discriminatory motive or by affirming
good faith.5 9 The Court emphasized that while this analysis restricted
the historic character of peremptory challenges by forcing a prosecutor
to give a reason for their exercise, a prosecutor's race-neutral explanation need not raise to the standard of a challenge for cause. 60
Reactions by commentators to Batson was generally positive. 6'
The next important case in the Strauder-Swain-Batson line was
Powers v. Ohio.62 Powers, a white man, was convicted of murder,
aggravated murder, and attempted aggravated murder. 63 During
jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to
remove seven black venirepersons from the jury. 64 Powers, citing
Batson, objected to each challenge and was overruled each time by
57. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) ("Once the defendant makes a
prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging black jurors.").
58. Id. ("But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case
of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race
on the assumption - or his intuitive judgment - that they would be partial to the
defendant because of their shared race.").
59. Id. at 98 ("Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making
individual selections."') (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
60. Id. at 97 ("Though this requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on
the full peremptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize that the
prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause.").
61. See, e.g., Sean Chapman, Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: A Significant

Step Toward Eliminating Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process, 29 AIZ. L.
REV.

697 (1987) (finding Batson to be a significant step toward eliminating discrim-

ination in the jury selection process); Cynthia Richers-Rowland, Note, Batson v.
Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1195
(1987) (limiting a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges will encourage their
proper use in criminal trials); Steven I. Shaw, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's
Response to the Problem of DiscriminatoryUse of Peremptory Challenges, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 581 (1985-86) (viewing Batson as a positive change over injustice
and the denial of equal protection under Swain).
62. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
63. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991).
64. Id.
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the court. Powers' appeals contended that the State's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges violated the Sixth Amendment's fair
cross-section guarantee in his petit jury and the Fourteenth Amend66
ment's equal protection rights.6 5 The Ohio Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of Ohio 67 both denied Powers' appeal. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, based
on the Equal Protection Clause, whether a white defendant could
object to a prosecutor's peremptory challenges of black venirepersons. 68 The Court did not consider Powers' Sixth Amendment claim
because while his certiorari petition was pending, the Court held in
Holland v. Illinois 9 that the Sixth Amendment did not restrict the
70
exclusion of a racial group at the peremptory challenge stage.
Ohio argued that a Batson challenge could be maintained only
7
if the defendant and excluded jurors were of the same race. '
Court disagreed, partially overruling Batson and holding that
"race is irrelevant to a defendant's standing to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges." ' 72 In rejecting this racial
limitation, the Court found it did not conform to its accepted rules
of standing for raising a constitutional claim, to the substantive
guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, or to the policies
underlying federal statutory law. 73 Describing statutory policy as
74
reflecting the central concern of the Fourteenth Amendment's
mandate to eliminate racial discrimination from all "official acts
and proceedings" of the State, 75 the Court focused on Powers'
65. Id.at 1364.
66. Ohio v. Powers, No. 87AP-526, 1988 WL 134822 (Ohio App. 1988).
67. Powers v. Ohio, 536 N.E.2d 1172 (Ohio 1989).
68. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1991).
69. 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (A white criminal defendant was found to have standing
to raise the issue of the fair cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment,
but the Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that the requirement applied to the
assembly of the venire, not to the final seated jury.).
70. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 487 (1990).
71. Powers v. Ohio, Il1 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1991).
72. Id. at 1373. The Powers Court stated that Batson "was designed 'to serve
multiple ends,' only one of which was to protect individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors . . . . Batson recognized that a prosecutor's

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges harms the excluded jurors and the

community at large." Id. at 1368. Unlike Batson which focused on harm to the
defendant, Powers focused on the harm to the excluded juror and the defendant's
standing to raise the excluded juror's equal protection claim.
73. Id. at 1368.
74. Id. at 1369.

75. Id.at 1373.
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right to third-party standing. 76
Powers would have third-party standing if three important criteria
were satisfied: (1) the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact,
(2) the litigant must have a close relation to the third party, and (3)
the third party must be hindered in her ability to protect her own
7
interests.1
The Court found that a defendant did suffer injury-in-fact because the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges "cast[ed] doubt
on the integrity of the judicial process ' 78 and questioned the fairness

of a criminal proceeding. 79 Analyzing the second criterion, the Court
found a common interest between the juror and the defendant in
eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom, thereby creating
confidence in the courts and their verdicts.8 0 The Court seemed to

find more than just a close relationship between juror and defendant

when it stated that voir dire may actually establish a "bond of trust." 8'
Finally, while recognizing that excluded jurors had the legal right to
bring their own actions, the reality was that in most cases they would
not because of both practical and economic barriers. 82 The Court
concluded that a criminal defendant, irrespective of his race, could
raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the
prosecution on racial grounds.83
Batson and Powers attempted to preserve the vitality of the
peremptory challenge while at the same time eliminate racial discrim76. Id. at 1370. "Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured
or been threatened with injury by governmental action complained of, and focuses
on the question of whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not

whether the issue itself is justiciable."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1405 (6th ed. 1990).

Third party standing refers to court-determined exceptions allowing a litigant to bring
a legal cause of action on behalf of injured third parties. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct.
1364, 1370 (1991).
77. Powers v. Ohio, Il1 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991); see also Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1976).
78. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. at 1371 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 556 (1979)).
79. Id. at 1371-72.
80. Id. at 1372.
81. Id. (" Voir dire permits a party to establish a relation, if not a bond of
trust, with the jurors. This relation continues throughout the entire trial and may in
some cases extend to the sentencing as well.").
82. Id. at 1373. The Court found "daunting barriers" facing an excluded juror
wishing to bring suit: (1) jurors have no opportunity to be heard at the time of their
exclusion; (2) excluded jurors cannot easily obtain declarative or injunctive relief if
discriminated against; (3) it is difficult for a juror to show systematic discrimination
against himself; and (4) there are practical barriers such as cost versus benefit that
provide little incentive for an excluded juror to bring suit. Id.
83. Id.
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ination from the courtroom. Batson and Powers, however, were
criminal cases; since the State was a party, the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment in each case was unquestioned. Hence, neither
case addressed peremptory challenges in civil suits where the State is
not a party. While the procedures for the use of peremptory challenges
in criminal trials were settled, Batson and Powers left a void over
how they could be used in the civil context. Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. filled this void.
III.
A.

EDMONSON V. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO.

FACTS

Thaddeus Donald Edmonson was injured in a job-site accident
84
at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave. Edmonson, a 34-yearold black male, was caught between the back bumper of a cement
truck owned by the Leesville Concrete Company and the front of a
curb-and-gutter machine. 5 Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in Federal District Court by virtue of the accident
6
having occurred in a federal enclave.1 The case was governed by the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.87 Edmonson invoked his Seventh Amendment right to trial by
88
jury.
During voir dire,8 9 Edmonson used his peremptory challenges to
9°
exclude three white persons from the jury; Leesville used its chal84. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 11 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991). Enclave
is defined as "a distinctly bounded area enclosed within a larger unit." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 451 (2d College ed. 1985).
85. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Brief for the Respondent at 2, Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (No. 89-7743).
86. Edmonson alleged 28 U.S.C. 1331 federal subject matter jurisdiction because the cause of action arose on federal land. Brief for the Respondent at 2,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (No. 89-7743).
87. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., III S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991). While
the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause as found in the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court in Boiling v. Sharpe found "the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American idea of fairness, are
not mutually exclusive." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The Court
stated that while the phrases "equal protection" and "due process" are not always
interchangeable, "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process." Id. at 498.
88. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080-81 (1991).
89. See discussion supra part II.A.
90. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991). See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying
text for an explanation of peremptory challenges.
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lenges to exclude two blacks and one white. 9 Citing Batson, Edmonson asserted Leesville's challenges were racially motivated, thereby
requiring Leesville to offer racially-neutral reasons for their exercise. 92
The district court rejected this, holding Batson did not apply to civil
proceedings, and further stating there had been no discrimination in
the jury selection procedure. 93 The jury awarded Edmonson $90,000,
but also found he was 80% contributorily negligent, thus reducing his
award to $18,000. 94
Edmonson appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit initially reversed in a two-to-one decision, holding Batson
applied to civil proceedings. 95 The court held that the exercise of
peremptory challenges was governmental in nature, 96 and that limiting
Batson to criminal cases would betray Batson's fundamental principle
that the State's approval of racially-motivated peremptory challenges
violated equal protection. 97 The court remanded for determination
whether Edmonson had established a Batson prima facie case of racial
discrimination.98
Subsequently, however, an en banc99 Fifth Circuit reversed itself
and affirmed the district court.' °° Two reasons prompted this reversal.
91. Edmonson, 11l S. Ct. at 2081. Eleven whites and one black were empaneled
from the original prospective juror pool of fifteen whites and three blacks. For a
preview of Edmonson, see Henry C. Strickland III, Can a Party in a Civil Trial Keep
Blacks Off the Jury?, PREv. OF U.S. Sup. CT. CASES, Jan. 25, 1991, at 139.
92. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991).
93. Brief for the Respondent at 3, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (No. 89-7743).
94. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.

95. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1314 (5th Cir. 1988)

(en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).

96. Id. at 1312. The court found the government "intimately involved in the
process by which a litigant challenges a prospective juror" because the government
summoned the venire, the challenges occurred in a judicial proceeding in a government
facility, action was required by the judge, and the Constitution required the courtroom
be open to the public. The court concluded that it would itself be a significant
participant in the discrimination, that the judge was intimately involved in the jury
selection process, and that the procedure of exercising peremptory challenges as a
whole was of governmental character. The government itself was involved as an actor
and thus provided the state action necessary to apply equal protection under the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1312-13.
97. Id. at 1314 ("If we were to limit Batson to criminal cases, we would betray
Batson's fundamental principle: the state's use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race violates the equal protection clause.").
98. Id. at 1315.
99. En banc refers to a full bench; a session where the entire membership of
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First, the court determined that state action was not present and

therefore the implicit equal protection guarantee of the Fifth

Amendment'0 1 could not be applied against either Edmonson or

3
Leesville. 0 2 Looking to Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,'1 the Fifth°4
action:1
Circuit noted there were two requirements for finding state
(1) the claimed deprivation resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in governmental authority; and (2) the
presence of some figure who could fairly be characterized as a state
actor. 105
The court found the first requirement clearly present because the
right to exercise peremptory challenges was governed by federal
statute. 1° The court, however, found the second requirement clearly
not present, because it did not find the presence of a figure who could

be characterized as a state actor.1° The court determined that only
the trial judge and Leesville's attorney were available for potential

characterization as state actors.1°8 Since the judge's role in excusing a
challenged juror was a "ministerial function," de minimis in nature,
the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular quorum. In the
United States, the circuit courts of appeals usually sit in panels of judges but for
important cases may expand the bench to a larger number, when they are said to be

sitting en banc.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

526-27 (6th ed. 1990).

100. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, III S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
101. See supra note 87 noting the Court's finding of an equal protection
guarantee in the Fifth Amendment.
102. 895 F.2d at 222.
103. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The Court found a Fourteenth Amendment due
process violation in a state's statutory scheme which allowed a prejudgment attachment of private property. A private party's joint participation with state officials in
seizing property was sufficient to characterize the private party as a state actor for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 941. For a complete analysis of the
state action doctrine see generally Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State
Action & the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1053 (1990); Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine & the
Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587 (1991); R. George Wright, State
Action & State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 685 (1989).
104. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
105. Id.
106. Id. ("The first requirement is clearly present here: that the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
governmental authority.").
107. Id. ("The second, however, seems equally clearly to be wanting: the
presence of some figure who can fairly be characterized as a state actor.").
108. Id.
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and without the exercise of judicial discretion, the court did not find
the judge to be a state actor when excusing challenged jurors and
therefore did not characterize the judge's function as state action. 10 9
Similarly, the court found it inconceivable that a privately retained
attorney could be viewed as a state actor."10 Without the presence of
a state actor there was no state action, and without state action, there
was no governmental deprivation of equal protection."'
The second major argument made by the court for reversal was
that exclusion of a venireman because a party felt he was biased in
favor of his opponent, for whatever reason, neither demeans him nor
impugns the trial's fairness." 2 A most important distinction exists
between denying blacks the opportunity to serve on juries based on
the suggestion they are unfit or incapable of serving because of racial
inferiority, and striking a black juror based on the possibility that the
juror himself is racially biased toward the attorney's client." 3
From this decision, Edmonson appealed. Due to splits in the
circuits over Batson's applicability to civil suits," ' 4 the Supreme Court

granted certiorari to settle the issue." 5

109. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1990)
(en banc), rev'd, III S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
To hold that this constitutes "action" would require our disregarding
expressions of the Court such as that found in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1004 (1982) .

.

. that a government "normally can be held responsible

for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement .

.

. that the choice must .

.

. be

deemed to be that of the State" and that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence
in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the
Id.

State responsible ...

under the ...

Fourteenth Amendment."

110. Id. at 222. The court mentioned several reasons why they found it inconceivable. Citing to Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), which held that a
public defender in a criminal proceeding was not a state actor, the Edmonson court
found it illogical and inconsistent to view a completely private attorney as a state
actor when a public defender would not be considered one. Furthermore, a private
attorney served the interests of his clients, and did not, as private counsel, perform
a public function. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 222.
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id. at 219.
113. Id. at 224 ("Such an action does not demean the stricken subject; it merely
recognizes a probable fact of life.").
114. See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir.
1990) (private litigant may not use peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons
on account of race); Reynolds v. Little Rock, 893 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1990) (Batson
applies to a civil case if the government is the litigant and is exercising the peremptory

1992:4971

B.

EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO.

THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

16
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cited Powers v. Ohio
for the proposition that a criminal defendant, regardless of race, may
17
object to a prosecutor's race-based peremptory challenges. He then

noted Powers "relied upon over a century of jurisprudence dedicated

to the elimination of race prejudice within the jury selection process.""' While noting past decisions had concerned discrimination by
9
government officials in criminal proceedings," Justice Kennedy stated
the Court had never suggested race discrimination was permissible in
civil proceedings.'2° In fact, the Edmonson Court found racial discrimination as harmful to excluded jurors in a civil proceeding as that in

a criminal trial.' 2' In each instance, the "honor and privilege of
participating in our system of justice"'

juror.

2

was denied the excluded

Next, the Court discussed against whom the Constitution's stric24
tures could be applied.'2 3 Relying upon NCAA v. Tarkanian,1 the
Court noted the guarantee of equal protection applies "in general

only to action by the government."'' 2 Furthermore, racial discrimi-

nation violated the Constitution "only when it may be attributed to
challenge.); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (Batson applies to exercise
of peremptory challenges by a private litigant in a civil case.).
115. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
116. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Powers.
117. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364
(1991)). The majority defined a peremptory challenge as allowing a party "to exclude
a given number of persons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service
on the petit jury." Id. at 2083. However, after making its state action analysis, the
Court apparently disagreed with its own definition, since it ultimately required private
litigants to provide race- neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges. Id. at
2088.
118. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081-82 (1991).
119. Id. at 2082 (The Court cites to the Strauder-Swain-Batson line of cases.).
120. Id.

121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (holding NCAA's sanction actions against the
UNLV did not constitute state action since the NCAA's rules were not Nevada's
rules and the UNLV could have withdrawn from the NCAA at any time).
125. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991). "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state
action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and
private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how
unfair that conduct may be." NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
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state action."' 1 Therefore, as the State was not a party, for Batson
to apply to civil suits, state action had to be found in Leesville's
peremptory challenges. 27 The issue thus became whether Leesville's
actions could be characterized as state action'.'
To resolve this issue, the Court looked to the two-part test of
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 29: (1) did the alleged constitutional
violation result from exercise of a right having its source in state
authority; and (2) could the private party charged with the deprivation
be fairly described as a state actor? 30 If the answers to both were
"yes," then Leesville was a state actor bound by the Constitution and
Batson.
The Court found the first part of the Lugar analysis easily
satisfied. 3 ' Peremptory challenges are creatures of judicial and legislative pronouncements;3 2 the Court noted that without such governmental sanction peremptory challenges would not exist, and
consequently Leesville could not have excluded anyone. 33
Moving to the second part of the Lugar analysis, whether a
private party could be fairly deemed to be a state actor, the Court
first recognized this was primarily a factual analysis. 13Nevertheless,
examination of precedent provided three factors to guide this analysis:
(1) the extent to which an actor relied on governmental assistance;'
126. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972) (state's issuance of a liquor license did not sufficiently implicate the
state in the lodge's discriminatory practices so as to characterize those practices as
state action).
127. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082 ("[T]he legality of the exclusion at issue
here turns on the extent to which a litigant in a civil case may be subject to the
Constitution's restrictions.").
128. Id.
129. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). The Supreme Court's analysis of Lugar's twopart test varied from that of the en banc Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court subdivided
the second part of the Lugar test into three "principles," and analyzed each principle
separately. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083. The Fifth Circuit's analysis simply consisted
of finding that neither a private attorney nor a judge in his ministerial role of
excusing a juror could be characterized as state actors. See Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077
(1991).
130. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
131. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083 ("There can beno question that the first
part of the Lugar inquiry is satisfied here.").
132. Id.
133. Id. ("Without this authorization, granted by an Act of Congress itself,
Leesville would not have been able to engage in the alleged discriminatory acts.").
134. Id.; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
135. Edmonson, Il1 S. Ct. at 2083; see Tulsa Professional Collection Servs.,
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(2) whether the actor was performing a traditional governmental
function;'3 6 and (3) whether 37the resultant injury was aggravated by
any governmental authority.'
In considering the first factor, the Edmonson Court cited Tulsa
3
Professional Collection Services v. Pope ' for the proposition that
state action exists if a private party makes extensive use of state
39
procedures with "the overt, significant assistance of state officials."
Applying this proposition to Edmonson's case, the Court found the
peremptory challenge system as well as the jury trial system could not4
'
exist without such overt and significant governmental participation."
This participation was evidenced by numerous statutory provisions
governing jury selection,' 41 and by examples of direct judicial involvement in voir dire. Examples of such direct judicial involvement
included determining the range of questions to be asked of prospective
jurors, in some cases having judges themselves conduct voir dire, and
42
overseeing the exclusion of jurors for cause. Of particular importance to the Court was the fact that the judge excused challenged
jurors;' 43 by enforcing a discriminatory challenge, the court "has not
Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (finding pervasive and substantial state involvement
in notice procedures to creditors' claims against an estate); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding discriminatory state action when a Negro
was refused service in a private restaurant leased in a building financed by public
funds and owned by an agency of the state).
136. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2083; see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(finding state action when a private political organization conducted political primaries
which were an integral part of the elective process); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946) (determining that a company-owned town used by the general public
should be treated as any other municipality when deciding an individual's Constitutional rights).
137. Edmonson, 11 S. Ct. at 2083; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(holding that state courts may not enforce restrictive covenants).
138. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).

139. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2084. "But when private parties make use of state
procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials, state action may
be found." Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988).
140. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2084.
141. Id.; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. sec. 1861 (1988) (declaration of policy); 28 U.S.C.
sec. 1862 (1988) (discrimination prohibited); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1863 (1988) (plan for
random jury selection); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1865 (1988) (qualifications for jury service).
142. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2084.
143. Id. at 2084-85. When a lawyer exercises a peremptory challenge, the judge
advises the juror he or she has been excused....
The party who exercises a challenge invokes the formal authority of the
court, which must discharge the prospective juror, thus effecting the "final
and practical denial" of the excluded individual's opportunity to serve on
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only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to place
its power, property, and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination."1"
The dissent found the peremptory challenge a wholly private
action in a government-managed setting. 45 All the evidence of overt,
significant participation mentioned by the majority, such as establishing jury service qualifications, summoning of jurors, the jury wheel,'4
and other functions was irrelevant. 14 7 Everything referred to was
simply a prerequisite to the use of the peremptory challenge. 14 "The
peremptory is, by design, an enclave of private action in a governmentmanaged proceeding."' 49 To the dissent, the only governmental participation in a peremptory challenge occurred when the judge dismissed the challenged juror, and this hardly rose to the level of
significant participation. 5 0
Analyzing the second factor, whether the actor is performing a
traditional governmental function, the Edmonson majority stated a
jury was "an entity that is a quintessential government body."'' This
is so because juries exercise a court's authority; they also safeguard
the rights of litigants and assure the citizenry will accept the legitimacy
of the legal system. 5 2

the petit jury ....

Id.

Without the direct and indispensable participation of the

judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge
system would serve no purpose.

144. Id. at 2085 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
725 (1961)).
145. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Physical device or electronic system for the storage and random selection
of the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors. A machine
containing the names of persons qualified to serve as grand and petit jurors,
from which, in an order determined by the hazard of its revolutions, are
drawn a sufficient number of such names to make up the panels for a given
term of court.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (6th ed. 1990).
147. Edmonson, II I S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. "The entirety of the Government's actual participation in the peremptory process boils down to a single fact: 'when a lawyer exercises a peremptory

challenge, the judge advises the juror he or she has been excused.' This is not
significant participation." Id. (citation omitted).
151. Edmonson, III S. Ct. at 2085.

152. Id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 11 S. Ct. 1364, 1369 (1991)).
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The Court stated that except for peremptory challenges, the entire
53 While the
jury selection process would constitute state action.'
government may delegate part of this power via peremptory chal54
lenges, the governmental character of the power remains. Thus, a
seemingly private act could, if it.is one link in a chain of governmental
functions, be deemed state action.
To counter this, Leesville cited Polk County v. Dodson,' which
held a public defender was not a state actor when representing a
criminal defendant. 5 6 Leesville's position, with which the dissent
agreed,' was that if a public defender, an obvious state employee,
was not viewed as a state actor, then by implication neither should a
private litigant. 5 However, the majority distinguished Polk by noting
the adversarial nature between a public defender and the government
when he is representing a criminal defendant. 5 9 The Court found no
such adversarial relationship existing in civil litigation between the
government and a private litigant, and found the government and
private litigants working for the same end;Iw that apparently meaning
153. Id. at 2086 ("Were it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no
question that the entire process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes
state action.").
154. Id. ("The fact that the government delegates some portion of this power
to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised.").
155. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The defendant, Dodson, was appealing a robbery
conviction. He claimed he was denied due process under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (civil
action for deprivation of rights) when the public defender withdrew as his counsel
on grounds that Dodson's appeal claims were frivolous. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 325.
157. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158. Brief for the Respondent at 4, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (No. 89-7743).
159. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086. The Court in Polk stated:
[A] defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the
servant of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards of
competence and integrity as a private lawyer ....

a public defender works

under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of
independent judgment on behalf of the client.
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981).
160. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086. "In the jury selection process, the government and private litigants work for the same end." Id. The dissent strongly disagreed
with the majority on this point since the opposing attorneys in a civil trial are in an
adversarial relationship, and they work for opposite ends. Therefore, "the government
cannot work for the same end as both parties" and in fact should be neutral. Id. at
2094-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the seating of an impartial jury. Because the end was the same, the
Court found that private litigants became government actors for the
limited purpose of using peremptory challenges during jury selection.' ," Therefore, the Court concluded, "the selection of jurors
represents a unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for
purposes of invoking constitutional protection against discrimination
1 62
by reason of race.'
The Court found the third factor of whether the injury caused
was aggravated in a unique way by governmental authority existed. 6a
The injuries caused by racial discrimination and exclusion from jury
service are compounded when they occur within the courtroom,
because it is courtrooms where the rights of individuals are determined
and where laws are invoked.' 64 Therefore, allowing "racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offend[ed] the dignity
of persons and the integrity of the court,' '1 65 and had the further
effect of casting into doubt the fairness of the proceedings.'"6 Having
found both parts of the Lugar analysis present, the Court concluded
Leesville's exercise of peremptory challenges constituted state action. 67
As Edmonson was not claiming his rights were violated, the
Court had to consider whether Edmonson had standing to assert the
excluded juror's equal protection rights. 68 While recognizing that a

litigant must normally assert his or her own legal rights, 69 the Court
noted that exceptions to this rule exist. Citing Powers v. Ohio,70 the
Court said third-party standing could be asserted if Edmonson demonstrated (1) he suffered a concrete, redressable injury; (2) he had a
close relation with the excluded jurors; and (3) that there existed

hindrances to the excluded jurors' ability to assert their rights.' 7'
The Court, again relying on Powers, found the third-party standing analysis equally applicable in civil trials and specifically met in
161. Id. at 2086 ("[S]o here a private entity becomes a government actor for
the limited purpose of using peremptories during jury selection.").
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2087.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991)).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2087.
Id.
111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372-73 (1991) (third-party standing found).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
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this case. 72 First, Edmonson suffered cognizable injury because use
of discriminatory peremptory challenges placed the integrity of the
trial in doubt.' 73 Second, a relationship was established between
Edmonson and the excluded jurors during voir dire that would
continue throughout trial. 174 Third, there indeed were serious obstacles
to prevent an excluded juror from bringing suit. 75 These obstacles
76
are no different whether exclusion is from criminal or civil trials.
The Edmonson Court, having found that Leesville's use of
peremptory challenges constituted state action and that Edmonson
had third-party standing, concluded the rule of Batson barring racially-motivated peremptory challenges applied in civil trials. 77 It then
whether a prima facie case of discrimiremanded for determination
78
nation had been made.
C.

ANALYSIS

Once the Edmonson majority had decided peremptory challenges
in civil proceedings were to be controlled by the Batson rule, they
were only left with the task of finding state action so Constitutional
requirements could be applied. The principal question is whether the
Court's use of precedent and historical perspective in finding the
required state action was both logical and consistent.
The Court set out to find state action and it did. Rather than
using dispassionate analysis,' 7 9 the Court used an "it is because we
say it is" method to reach its preordained conclusion. The Court has
always taken a restrictive view in finding state action, based on a
principle of finding some responsibility on the part of the government
for the specific conduct.'10 Although the Edmonson court claims to
have established that responsibility, a strong case can be made that it
did not. While discrimination is abhorrent, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments only protect citizens from governmental abuse. A sphere
of individual freedom and choice exists beyond governmental control
and this sphere has been protected by the Constitution and the courts
since the beginning of our nation. Not everyone, including the gov172. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.

173. Id. at 2088.

174. Id. at 2087-88.

175. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2088-89.
Id. at 2088.
180. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ernment, may always agree with how individuals express those freedoms, but those freedoms are the foundation of our democracy.
Government can set an example by its actions and can encourage
others to follow, but it must understand and respect the limits of its
authority.
The Court began its discussion with the Lugar state action
analysis.' The first part of the Lugar analysis was easily satisfied; 1 2
peremptory challenges have their source in state authority. However,
the second part of the Lugar analysis was more complicated and the
ultimate answer depended upon how the Court chose to analyze the
three guiding factors they considered determinative.'
First, the Court found that "a private party could not exercise
its peremptory challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of
the court.' '8 4 One argument the Court put forward to justify its
finding of overt and significant assistance concerned the active participation of the government in the jury selection process.'8 5 However,
all the functions mentioned by the Court are merely separate steps
involved in the process of seating a jury.8 6 Apparently the logic is
that if all the other functions involved in jury selection are government
controlled, then peremptory challenges must receive similar treatment.
While all the practices mentioned by the majority are government
controlled, they exist independently of the peremptory challenge. In
the end, all the practices listed are irrelevant to the peremptory
challenge. Recognizing this, the dissent found the peremptory to be
"an enclave of private action in a government managed proceeding."'8 7 The only real government participation in the peremptory
challenge process occurs when the judge dismisses the challenged
juror.' 8 Since a judge may do nothing more than say "you are
181. Edmonson, Il1 S. Ct. at 2082.
182. Id. at 2083.
183. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three
principles and the cases from which they derived.
184. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (1991).
185. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. sec. 1861 (1988) (declaration of policy); 28 U.S.C. sec.
1862 (1988) (discrimination prohibited); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1863 (1988) (plan for random
jury selection); 28 U.S.C. sec. 1865 (1988) (qualifications for jury service).
186. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The bulk of
the practices the Court describes ...

are independent of the statutory entitlement to

peremptory strikes, or of their use.").
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2091 ("The entirety of the Government's actual participation in the
peremptory process boils down to a single fact: When a lawyer exercises a peremptory
challenge, the judge advises the juror he or she has been excused.").
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excused," it stretches credulity to find overt, significant participation
in that simple administrative act. Using result-oriented jurisprudence,
the majority found overt, significant participation by focusing on the
entire jury selection process rather than on the real issue, the peremptory challenge process.
Still searching for overt and significant assistance, the Court
advanced another argument based on the notion that without the
participation of the judge, the peremptory challenge system would
serve no purpose. 8

9

Suggesting there would be no practical use for

peremptory challenges without the presence of a judge, a courtroom,
or a judicial system is certainly an accurate observation. However,
the fact that peremptory challenges outside of a courtroom have little
utility does not answer the question of whether the assistance is overt
and significant. The issue is one of degree of assistance, not whether
assistance simply exists. The Court makes a specious argument that
again evidences result-oriented jurisprudence.
Second, the Court finds the exercise of peremptory challenges to
be a traditional government function.' 9° It reaches this conclusion by
first finding that a jury is a governmental body.' 91 Apparently the
reasoning is that if a jury is a governmental body, any means used to
select that body, including the use of peremptory challenges, must be
a governmental function. While this reasoning would hold true for a
prosecutor using peremptory challenges in representing the state, it is
difficult to conceive how a private litigant exercising peremptory
challenges performs a government function. A private litigant uses
peremptory challenges to seat a jury that is fair, but preferably partial
to his or her view of the dispute. In a civil proceeding between private
litigants, the government should be impartial and its function is
certainly not to obtain a jury partial to either side. Impartiality is
critical in promoting the judicial appearance of fairness, an important
policy goal. The majority's determination that the government and
private adversarial litigants work for the same end in jury selection is
logically inconsistent with that goal. The working-for-the-same-end
theory is also contrary to the concept of our adversary-based judicial
system 92 which envisions opposing parties seeking individually favorable results in a neutral court setting.
189. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085 ("Without the direct and indispensable
participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor, the peremptory
challenge system would serve no purpose.") (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The dissent found that, historically speaking, the peremptory
challenge is not a traditional government function at all, but rather
the tradition "is one of unguided private choice."' 93 Finally, the
majority asserted that "were it not for peremptory challenges," the
entire jury determination process would constitute state action. 194 By
the very phrasing of that statement, the majority answered its own
question. Except for peremptory challenges, the entire jury determination process constitutes state action.
Third, the Court considers the discriminatory injury to have been
intensified by its occurrence in the courthouse itself. 195 To countenance
the validity of this statement, one must accept the assumption that
all that occurs in the physical environment of the courthouse is
attributable in some fashion to the government. Yet the Court agreed
with the holding of Polk County v. Dodson,'9 finding that a public
defender could be characterized as a private actor, indicating the
Court did not view every action occurring in the courthouse to be the
responsibility of the government. 97 Once again, discrepant logic is
applied in the Court's effort to vindicate its decision.
D.

PRACTICAL IMPACT

The impact of the Edmonson decision may manifest itself in both
the future of the peremptory challenge and the state action doctrine.
The peremptory challenge has been weakened and may ultimately be
abolished. While the decision has directly affected future court determinations of state action, the ultimate result remains uncertain. 98
Peremptory challenges have a long history and tradition as a part
of trial by jury.' 99 Peremptory challenges have traditionally been
viewed as one means of "assuring the selection of a qualified and
unbiased jury,' '20 and the Court has suggested "that the requirement
of 'an impartial jury' impliedly compels peremptory chal193. Id. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (1991).
195. Id. at 2087.
196. 454 U.S. 312 (1981); see supra note 155 discussing Dodson.
197. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("If Dodson stands for anything, it is that the actions of a lawyer
in a courtroom do not become those of the government by virtue of their location.
This is true even if those actions are based on race.").
198. See Martin A. Schwartz, State Action: Revival or One-Night Stand?, N.Y.

L.J., Aug. 20, 1991, at 3 (discussing questions arising in reconciling the Court's
precedential state action cases with. their finding in Edmonson).
199. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965).
200. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
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lenges .. ."201 Congress has recognized the importance of peremptory
challenges by specifically granting them to all persons in a federal
civil proceeding. 2°2
There are a number of important functions fulfilled by peremptory challenges: (1)they allow for the removal of jurors suspected of
being biased, but for whom it may be difficult to formulate legal
objections which rise to the level of a challenge for cause; (2) they
allow for the removal of jurors antagonized during voir dire; and (3)
they allow the litigants increased participation in the selection of their
own jury, furthering twin policy goals of creating verdicts acceptable
to both the parties involved and the public and creating the perception
of a fair and impartial trial.
Applying the Batson rule to civil trials will affect the civil litigant's
use of the peremptory challenge in several ways. First, it may prevent
challenges to jurors who are in fact racially biased. There will always
exist a certain number of individuals from any particular group who
will be biased towards members of their own group regardless of the
circumstances. This fact does not necessarily connote a negative trait,
it merely illustrates the reality of human nature.
Bias, however, may not always be discoverable in a way that
would give rise to a challenge for cause. When selecting juries,
experienced trial attorneys rely on their "hunches,' ''instincts," and
skills in perceiving human behavior. Requiring race-neutral explanations not only ignores the reality that any member of a race may be
biased at any given time toward a particular person or about a
particular subject, but requires attorneys to provide objective explanations for their subjective impressions. It may not always be possible
to articulate subjective impressions into objective explanations, and
consequently, challenges may be denied and biased jurors seated.
Second, since both parties, regardless of race,203 may make Batson
claims of discrimination, and since Batson should now logically apply
to criminal defense attorneys, racial minorities may in fact be inhibited
in seating members of their own race. Peremptory challenges have at
2°4
times assured a racially diverse jury rather than prevented one.
Third, the question from Batson of what constitutes a sufficient
race-neutral explanation which "need not rise to the level of justifying

201. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 808 (1990).
202. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1870 (1988).
203. Powers v. Ohio, I11 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
204. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 11 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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exercise of a challenge for cause ' 20 must now be answered in civil
proceedings. The use of this quasi-peremptory challenge 201 adds another duty to our over-burdened courts. 2°7
Finally, while Batson spoke in terms of a "cognizable racial
group, "208 the reasoning that shared race may not be used to show
bias arguably applies with equal force to gender, 2°9 ethnic background,
age, religion, or any other classfication of persons who share certain
characteristics. 210 Is it any less derogatory to assume that women are
incapable of impartially judging other women simply because they are
women? Does age reflect on the competence of a person to be an

205. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
206. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1317 (5th Cir.
1988) (Gee, J., dissenting) ("[A] strange procedural creature indeed: a challenge for
semi-cause . . .a skewed and curious device, exercisable without giving reasons in
some cases but not in others, all depending on race."), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
207. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Thus, yet another
complexity is added to an increasingly Byzantine system of justice that devotes more
and more of its energy to sideshows and less and less to the merits of the case.").
208. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
209. See Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated, 948
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1991) (Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration of Fifth
Amendment objection to gender.'based peremptory challenges in light of Edmonson
decision; circuit court declined to consider the issue as it found Sky Chef's objections
untimely); United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1990) (government objected to female defendant's peremptory challenges of male jurors and the
court found Batson's rationale applied equally well to gender-based peremptory
challenges). But see United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988)
(the court declined to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges because
it found no authority to overcome its presumption that Batson applied only to racial
discrimination.).
210. Batson determined that the opportunity for jury service was more important
than the unqualified use of peremptory challenges. The Court stated: "In view of
the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice
system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is
disqualified from jury service because of his race." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 99 (1986). If we substitute the words ethnic origin, age, or religion for the word
"race" in the quote, does it make the Court's statement less true? The Court said
the peremptory challenge had been used at times to discriminate against blacks, but
then it has undoubtedly been used to "discriminate" at times against every conceivable
group. Attorneys use peremptory challenges to eliminate persons they feel will be
biased against their client. The attorney's judgment as to which jurors he feels may
be biased will naturally depend upon the client's identity and the particular facts of
the case. Of course if the Court were to logically apply their reasoning to all groups,
use of the peremptory challenge would become unworkable. Apparently the Court,
in order to preserve the peremptory challenge, decided to apply their reasoning only

to race.
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impartial juror? The answer should be obvious. An infinite variety of
groups may eventually step forward, each asking for their equal
protection rights. 21 ' Such an eventuality would probably make the use
of peremptory challenges unworkable and lead to their complete
elimination.
One of the primary purposes of the state action doctrine is to
preserve individual freedom. 212 The Edmonson decision "overhauls
the doctrine of state action,''213 and presumably every aspect of every
civil trial, state and federal, is now constitutionalized. 2 4 Are all the
actions of an attorney in a judicial proceeding now subject to constitutional attack or a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983?2"5
Edmonson has left many unanswered questions.
211. Certainly the Court has not given the same kind of heightened scrutiny to
classifications such as age, religion, etc. that it has given to race or gender. See Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding gender classifications requiring an intermediate
type of scrutiny); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(finding age classification requires only rationally-related type scrutiny); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (finding race to be a "suspect" classification
requiring "the most rigid scrutiny"). However, persons in these lower-scrutiny groups
could argue that the Court should take a more flexible view of equal protection as it
affects jury service. Is governmental interest in preserving the peremptory challenge
so compelling that only racial groups will be entitled to special protection? Other
than merely recognizing the value of peremptory challenges, the Court certainly did
not indicate they felt preserving the peremptory challenge was of compelling interest.
Considering the Court's discussion of the courthouse and the courtroom "where the
law itself unfolds," it seems incredulous that the Court could in the future condone
ethnic, age, or religious discrimination in the same courthouse and courtroom.
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991).
212. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial
power .... A major consequence is to require the courts to respect the
limits of their own power as directed against state governments and private
interests. Whether this isgood or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of
our political order.
Id. at 936-37 (emphasis added).
213. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
215. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1988) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
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CONCLUSION

Racial discrimination is morally and legally wrong. It is particularly abhorrent in the judicial system, but the Constitution only
protects individuals from discrimination for which the government is
responsible. The government is not responsible for and cannot control
all discrimination, perceived or real. The Court in Edmonson simply
followed a century-old line of cases which have attempted to eliminate
racial discrimination from the courtroom. The question is whether it
found government responsibility where it did not exist in order to
make a moral statement.
The very definition of the peremptory challenge precludes an
explanation for its use. Inherent in the definition is the possibility
that the challenge will be used freely to discriminate." 6 The Court
considered this possibility unacceptable, and in order to prevent it,
found that private litigants may be considered state actors when
exercising peremptory challenges, therefore subjecting them to the
Batson rule barring racially-motivated peremptory challenges.
While the decision was notably symbolic and may aid in preventing certain attorneys from using their clients' limited number of
peremptory challenges to manifest purely racial biases, it is questionable whether the Court's finding of state action was reasonable and
whether the subsequent effect on both the peremptory challenge and
the state action doctrine will find the cure to be more damaging than
the perceived injury. The peremptory challenge is made less effective,
and if the equal protection standard is extended to the myriad of
groups who theoretically can make such claims, the use of the
challenge would become procedurally unworkable, leading to its elimination. The elimination of the peremptory challenge could actually
make it more difficult to seat an impartial jury by permitting biased
jurors to be seated. If the Court could find state action in this case,
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
Id.

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute
of the District of Columbia.
216. Considering that each party has only three peremptory challenges in a

federal civil trial, it is reasonable to question how many attorneys would actually
squander these few challenges simply to discriminate against one race or another. If
an attorney perceives racial bias in a prospective juror, he or she should act upon it.
While it is impossible to know how an excused juror would have actually voted, an
attorney is expected to make decisions using his or her experience and judgment.
Realistically, attorneys make right and wrong decisions, but this should not be an
area for government intervention and government determination of an attorney's
judgment.
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525

then it is an open question as to when private action will be characterized as state action and therefore subjected to constitutional requirements.
FREDERICK V. OLSoN

